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Abstract
Following a decline in the fundamental risk of assets, the ability of
banks to expand the balance sheet under a Value-at-Risk constraint in-
creases (as in Adrian and Shin (2010)), boosting the bank’s incentives to
provide costly monitoring eﬀort that prevents asset deterioration. On the
other hand, high asset demand and prices, eventually, raise the bank’s pay-
oﬀ in the event of liquidation associated to asset deterioration, jeopardiz-
ing incentives. This paper shows that a microprudential regulatory regime
that disregards the equilibrium eﬀect of macro variables (asset prices) on
micro behavior (eﬀort), performs poorly as low fundamental (exogenous)
risk reduces bank’s eﬀort and induces high (endogenous) deterioration
risk. This analysis calls for a macroprudential regulatory regime in which
the equilibrium feedback eﬀect is fully taken into account by the author-
ity in designing incentive compatible capital requirements, providing a
theoretical foundation to the countercyclical buﬀer of Basel III.
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1 Introduction
The fact that under certain conditions the financial system contributes with
additional volatility to macroeconomic dynamics is nowadays a shared and well
analyzed view (Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke et al. (1999), for a recent
survey Panetta et al. (2009)). And indeed, in the aftermath of the crisis, many
analysts, commentators and policymakers blamed the financial industry for their
devastating contribution to the run-up of the crisis.
Financial regulation did also have some responsibilities. Flaws in micro-
prudential rules have in fact provided bankers with head-we-win-tail-they-loose
incentive structures, fostering excessive risk-taking, deterioration of lending
standards and perverse behaviors (Borio (2008); Buiter (2007); Kashyap et al.
(2007); for a discussion, see Cannata and Quagliariello (2009)). In the benev-
olent version, bankers and individual institutions were not perfectly in the po-
sition to foresee the ongoing overheated dynamics and the imminent burst as
they miss a bird’s eye view of the economic system. In this respect, it was up
to policy makers and regulatory authorities to address the problem of external-
ities that arise from the ineﬃcient aggregate outcome of individually optimal
decision-making. And they have failed to do so. While macroprudential issues
were increasingly debated before the eruption of the crisis (Crockett (2000), Bo-
rio (2003)), they were mainly confined to macroprudential analysis, with almost
no room for macroprudential policies, not to mention concrete tools (Clement
(2010)).
The debate on macroprudential issues is still lively and answers to relevant
questions are still not completely conclusive.
• First, some policymakers and academics (Borio et al. (2001)) argue that
the cycle is endogenous to the behavior of financial institutions.1 In this
sense, the rationale of macroprudential regulation should go beyond the
accumulation of capital in good times to be released when the bad times
arrive. We provide insights that support this view highlighting the mu-
tual interplay between macro variables, individual incentives of banks in
implementing sound risk management and prudential rules.
1According to Borio et al. (2001), those decisions are frequently based on misperceptions
of the evolution of risk over time. The stylized facts are simple. During expansions, inter-
mediaries tend to underestimate risk exposures to risks, relaxing borrowers selection criteria
and monitoring processes. Accordingly, they also reduce the amount of provisions for fu-
ture losses. After the peak of the cyclical upturn, customers’ profitability worsens, borrowers
creditworthiness deteriorates and losses are revealed. This pattern is often coupled with the
fall of asset prices that, in turn, further aﬀects customers’ financial wealth and depresses the
value of collateral. Banks’ exposures to credit risk increase, thus requiring larger provisions
and higher levels of capital, at the very moment when capital is more expensive or simply
not available. Intermediaries may react by reducing lending, thus exacerbating the eﬀects of
economic downturn.
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• Second, the role of macro variables as asset prices in the allocation and
in the build up of risk. In the model banks’ utility and incentives cru-
cially depend on asset prices. We argue that high asset prices jeopardize
incentives.
• Finally, why and how should capital requirements evolve along the busi-
ness cycle. The model highlights the drawbacks of microprudential risk-
weighted capital requirement in line with the Basel II Accord and provides
theoretical foundations to macroprudential buﬀers as in the Basel III pro-
posal.
A new macroprudential orientation has been undoubtedly one of the key
blocks of the reform roadmap. The Financial Stability Board (2009), clearly
stated that a macroprudential orientation focuses policy on avoiding damage to
the financial system as a whole with an eye to the impact on the real economy.
Accordingly, Bernanke (2009) pointed out the need to combine a systemwide, or
macroprudential, perspective with firm-specific risk analysis to better anticipate
problems that may arise from the interactions of firms and markets. These
principles have been transposed in prudential regulation by the Basel Committee
(2010). While the system-wide perspective cannot be circumscribed to it, most
of the policy measures focused on procyclicality. In particular, the Committee
introduced countercyclical capital buﬀers above minimum capital requirements
that banks are required to build-up in buoyant economic conditions. In practice,
it is still controversial what macroprudential policies are supposed to achieve.
On the one hand, the most pragmatic view advises not to attach excessive
emphasis to the potential of such instruments. Macroprudential tools should
just aim at ensuring that financial intermediaries accumulate suﬃcient resources
in good times when they are cheap and risk is underestimated that can be run-
down in bad times with no or little repercussions to financial stability. On the
other, according to a more ambitious view, the macroprudential policy should
go hand in hand with monetary policy and directly aim at managing economic
cycles (for a survey, see Galati and Moessner (2010)).
We analyze macroprudential regulation using an incentives model in which
banks perform two value-adding activities: monitoring of their asset holdings
and screening of new assets. Monitoring prevents value-destroying asset deteri-
oration. In the bad state of deterioration, the bank sells oﬀ assets at a discount
liquidation price and exits the market. The bank’s second activity consists in
screening new risky assets to expand the balance sheet. The amount of assets
the bank can purchase is aﬀected by a Value-at-Risk constraint (as in Adrian
and Shin (2010)). We refer to banks that participate to asset purchases as “ac-
tive”. The double activity (monitoring and screening) requires high eﬀort and
eﬀort is costly for the bank. This create rooms for shirking behavior for active
banks that may be tempted to trade-oﬀ a positive probability of deterioration
with saving in eﬀort costs. The opportunity cost of eﬀort thus depends on (i)
the liquidation price of assets and (ii) the amount of assets the bank can pur-
chase when it avoids deterioration. Low fundamental risk and high fundamental
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value of assets relax the VaR constraint and ameliorates banks’ incentives. In
the model, a prudential authority is delegated to prevent non incentive com-
patible banks to be active. Incentive compatibility is endogenously derived as a
condition on the minimum bank’s equity (capital requirement). Under a micro-
prudential regulatory regime, the authority disregards the equilibrium eﬀects of
positive shocks to fundamentals on asset prices (macro variable) and from asset
prices to incentives. Indeed, high prices jeopardize banks’ incentives both in-
creasing the liquidation income in the bad state of deterioration and decreasing
the amount of new asset the bank can purchase under the VaR constraint. This
type of externality (see below) follows from a purely “macro” phenomenon a` la
Borio (2003) and should be taken into account by the regulatory authority in
designing capital requirements. We show that the equilibrium (macropruden-
tial) capital requirement is increasing in the fundamental value of assets and
decreasing with the fundamental risk, thus providing theoretical underpinnings
to macroprudential capital buﬀer of the Basel III proposal.
What is peculiar of our model is that it contemplates an externality, and
the need for a policy intervention, as the consequence of improvements to fun-
damentals. Absent regulation, positive shocks exert two competing eﬀects on
incentives. Behaving banks with a positive asset demand sustain asset prices.
This encourages shirking banks to free ride other banks eﬀort, enjoying pri-
vate benefits from low eﬀort and high prices in liquidation. In the expanding
phase of the cycle, low risk and/or high asset value increase the balance sheet
capacity of banks. The positive price externality triggered by behaving banks
sows the seeds of the following downturn as it decreases the marginal value of
eﬀort so inducing the build up of deterioration risk. The opposite happens if
high deterioration risk materializes. Shirking banks would start to sell oﬀ their
asset holdings. Eventually, low asset prices boosts incentives and increase the
marginal value of eﬀort.
Our approach is thus complementary to standard models, which rely mainly,
if not uniquely, on negative exogenous shocks and amplification mechanisms (see
Rochet et al. (1996), Allen and Gale (2004)) and is related to the endogenous
risk literature (Morris and Shin (2003), Danielsson and Shin (2003)). Indeed,
in the model, we can distinguish between two components of risk: a funda-
mental (perceived, exogenous) risk and an endogenous “deterioration” risk that
depends on incentives. When fundamental risk is low – which typically happens
in good times – banks become eager to expand the balance sheet. This ame-
liorates incentives and, under a microprudential regulatory regime, determines
the minimum incentive compatible equity to decrease. However, the indirect
eﬀect that goes through higher demand and asset prices, jeopardize incentives
and operates in the opposite direction. Banks may be tempted to leverage the
booming times to save on costly eﬀort (high prices guarantees high payoﬀs from
asset liquidation). This behavior increases, eventually, the overall risk in the
economy. We are in line with the view that macroprudential orientation of
regulation can eﬀectively correct perverse behaviors and implement eﬃciency
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reducing the amplitude of boom-bust financially driven cycles.
In section 2.1 we describe the building blocks of the model. Then we ana-
lyze the bank’s incentive problem and the demand for assets according to the
Value-at-Risk constraint (section 2.2 and 2.3). Capital requirements for banks,
and their evolution in response to change in fundamentals, are derived from
incentive compatibility (section 2.4). We characterize the microprudential reg-
ulatory regime (section 2.5), assuming the authority disregards the eﬀects of
shock to fundamentals on asset prices and from asset prices to individual bank
incentives (section 2.5). We describe the macroprudential dimension of capital
regulation (section 2.6) and discuss the dynamics of the incentives through the
cycle (section 3). Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Description
There are three dates: t = 0, 1, 2. All agents are risk neutral and do not discount
future cash flows. There are three types of agents: borrowers, market investors
and banks.
Borrowers Borrowers have profitable projects or ideas. Projects require a
unitary initial investment and payoﬀ at date 2 a positive random amount
w˜. The probability structure of w˜ is: E(w˜) = q, min(w˜) = q − z and
max(w˜) = q + z. We refer to z ∈ (q − 1, q) as the fundamental risk. The
role of borrowers is really passive and we often treat them as securities
that are purchased by banks. All the following considerations hold for
the case of firms that are financed with loans or households that take out
mortgages. Borrowers need to be monitored.2 Lack of monitoring implies
value-destroying asset quality deterioration: if at date t a borrower is
not adequately monitored, with probability 1−π the quality of its project
deteriorates and the associated payoﬀ declines to w˜−c where c ∈ (0, q−z)
at date t + 1. In this case, if the bank that holds the deteriorated asset
liquidates it, the latter would payoﬀ a random amount w˜ − c at date
t + 2 to the purchasing bank. Otherwise (no liquidation) it would payoﬀ
zero with certainty. Thus, following deterioration, banks always prefer to
liquidate and we assume they exit the market after liquidation. For sake of
expositional convenience, we distinguish between two kinds of securities:
long term (LT) and short term (ST) securities. The only diﬀerence is the
date at which they are purchased by banks:
• Each bank holds one long term security, purchased before date 0 at
a unitary price (see Table 1).
2Only banks can provide adequate monitoring so that borrowers are not able to raise
external financing directly from market investors.
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• Short term securities are in a fixed supply S and are purchased (fi-
nanced) by banks at date 1 at the equilibrium price p ∈ [1, q).3 To
provide a scope for screening, one can imagine that, at the date 1
market for securities, besides ST securities, borrowers supply even
junk assets that payoﬀ zero at date 2 so that banks must screen
to isolate junk assets. The latter are not purchased (financed) in
equilibrium. Finally, note that LT securities in liquidation would be
traded at the discount price p− c.
Investors A large number of perfectly competitive market investors (say house-
holds, pension funds, etc.) that hold and purchase banks’ debt.
Banks The banking system is made up of a population of unit mass of banks
that are uniformly distributed with respect to equity e. We treat e, to-
gether with the LT security, as an initial endowment for the bank. Table
1 shows the bank’s initial balance sheet.
Table 1: Bank’s initial balance sheet
Assets Liabilities
1− e, debt
1, long term security
e, equity
Finally, we assume banks cannot raise additional equity.
2.2 The problem of the bank
Banks can be active, i.e. participate to the date 1 market for assets or inactive.
When active, the bank can decide to behave, i.e. put high eﬀort to simultane-
ously (i) monitor the LT security to prevent deterioration and (ii) screen new
assets, or to shirk, i.e. put low eﬀort, save on eﬀort costs and accept a positive
probability of deterioration. Saving on eﬀort yields a private benefits B > 0 (as
in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)). When inactive the bank ends date 2 with its
initial portfolio.4 Behaving banks prevent asset deterioration and expand their
balance sheet purchasing new assets at date 1. Shirking banks (if any, see be-
low) that experience asset deterioration would liquidate their LT asset holding
at the price p− c.
3Note that when p = 1 the bank appropriates the entire outcome of the borrower investment
project. On the other hand, the price cannot exceed the expected value q.
4Between date 0 and 1, banks should monitor their LT security to prevent deterioration
and screen potential borrowers to isolate junks. We assume that it is this dual activity implies
disutility to the bank. Between date 1 and 2, banks need only to monitor their portfolios.
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Expected utilities are:
• For a behaving bank:
UH = (q − p)x+ q (1)
where (q − p)x is the expected payoﬀ from new securities x purchased at
date 1 at the price p and q the expected payoﬀ from the initial LT security.
• For a shirking bank:
UL = π[(q − p)x+ q] + (1− π)(p− c) +B (2)
The shirking bank experiences asset deterioration with probability 1 − π
and liquidate at the price p− c.
• The expected utility of an inactive bank is simply:
UI = q +B (3)
Figure 1: The timing of events in the model.
✲
Date 0 Date 1 Date 2
IC￿
￿
￿✒
❅
❅
❅❘ Active
✲Inactive q +B
✟✟
✟✟✯
❍❍❍❍❥
Shirk ✲ Liquidation ✲
❍❍❍❍❥
p− c+B
π
1− π
Behave ✲ Asset acquisition ✲ qx+ q
2.3 The demand for assets
At date 1, active banks that do not experience deterioration can aﬀord the
balance sheet expansion, issuing new debt and purchasing new assets. We follow
Adrian and Shin (2010) assuming that the asset demand x is aﬀected by a Value-
at-Risk (VaR) constraint
VaR ≤ e
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The VaR constraint stipulates that the bank’s equity is large enough so that
the default probability is kept below some benchmark level. Default would occur
when, at date 2, the value of the bank’s assets is lower than the value of the
bank’s debt, that is 1− e+ px. With no loss of generality, we assume that the
benchmark default level is zero. Then, the VaR constraint is (q − z)(x + 1) ≥
1− e+ px or, rearranging terms:
e− {[p− (q − z)]x+ [1− (q − z)]} ≥ 0
where [p− (q − z)]x+ [1− (q − z)] > 0 is the worst case loss. As the utility
of the bank is increasing in x, the VaR constraint is always binding. Solving for
x, we get the asset demand of a bank with equity e:
x =

e−1+q−z
p−q+z , if e > 1− (q − z)
0 otherwise
(4)
The demand is non decreasing in the equity e, in the fundamental value of
assets q and increasin in the price p and risk z.
2.4 Incentives and capital requirements
To make things interesting we assume that shirking destroys value in expecta-
tions (the expected payoﬀ of the LT project of a shirking bank is lower than its
cost):
πq + (1− π)(q − c) < 1
and that private benefits are large enough
B >
1− π
π
(q − p+ c)
so that there exists a positive mass of banks that would prefer shirking both
to inactivity and to behave (banks with e ∈ (e0, e¯) In Graph 1 below).
We follow the “representation hypothesis” of Dewatripont and Tirole (1994)
and introduce a scope for prudential regulation assuming that a regulatory au-
thority is delegated to restrict the possibility for non incentive compatible banks
to be active so avoiding value destruction.
Banks incentive compatibility states that the expected utility from behaving
is higher than the utility from shirking:
(q − p)x+ q ≥ π[(q − p)x+ q] + (1− π)(p− c) +B
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Graph 1: Incentives and the capital requirement.
✲
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e¯
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We follow the “representation hypothesis” of Dewatripont and Tirole (1994)
and introduce a scope for prudential regulation assuming that a regulatory au-
thority is delegated to restrict the possibility for non incentive compatible banks
to be active so avoiding value destruction.
Banks incentive compatibility states that the expected utility from behaving
is higher than the utility from shirking:
(q − p)x+ q ≥ π[(q − p)x+ q] + (1− π)(p− c) +B
Rearranging terms and using the equation (4) for x, the regulatory constraint
can be reformulated as a condition on the minimum equity:
e ≥ e¯ ≡ (p− c+ b− q)(p− q + z)
q − p + 1− q + z (5)
where b ≡ (1 − π)B is again a measure of private benefits from saving on
eﬀort.
The regulatory intervention sets an incentive compatibility constraint that
is a capital requirement: only if the bank meets that requirement is allowed to
be active. Graph 1 depicts how the capital requirement would work in practice.
The bank is endowed with a certain amount of capital e, which determines its
ability (quantity x(e)) to subscribe new assets under the VaR constraint. The
quantity of assets, in turn, is a driver of the bank’s incentives. The supervi-
sory authority does not allow the bank to carry on actions that lead to value
destruction and pursues this objective setting a minimum capital requirement
(the policy instrument). Banks with equity e ≥ e¯ can be active as they are
expected to put high eﬀort and prevent asset deterioration.
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Turning back to the incentive compatibility constraint, the demand x and
the expected return q are both disciplinary devices for the bank as they raise
the relative payoﬀ from behaving. On the other hand, the possibility to extract
a positive income p− c in liquidation jeopardizes bank’s incentives.
2.5 Microprudential regulation
We analyze the eﬀects of a decline in risk z and those of an increase of the
fundamental value q of assets under two diﬀerent regulatory regimes. We refer
to the first one as microprudential regulation: the regulatory authority simply
sets the capital requirement according to condition (5), taking p as given and
fixed.
Following a decline in risk z￿ < z, the minimum incentive compatible equity
decreases. In the regulatory interpretation, in the expanding phase of the cycle
when fundamental risk is low, the minimum capital requirement declines as low
risk relaxes the VaR constraint and the authority expects banks incentives to be
more easily aligned. Another way to visualize the same eﬀect is the following: for
any given amount of equity, the demand x is inversely related to risk. Therefore,
low risk boosts incentives and the minimum equity decreases.
Graph 2: Decline in risk z￿ < z and microprudential requirements.
✲
✻
e
U
✘✘✘
✘✘✘
✘✘✘
✘✘✘
✘✘✘
✘✘✘
✘
UH(z)
UL(z)
0
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟
e¯(z)
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✏✏
✏✏
✏✏
✏✏
✏✏
✏✏
✏✏
✏
e¯(z￿)
UH(z￿)
UL(z￿)
Note that an improvement of the fundamental value of assets (q￿ > q) exerts
the same eﬀects of a decline in risk. Indeed, the VaR constraint becomes less
binding, increasing the payoﬀ from behaving. The minimum equity e¯ declines
accordingly.
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It is interesting to point out that, while the capital requirement used in
our model is extremely simplified and very far from actual prudential rules,
it still shows some characteristics that make it consistent with the Basel II
risk-sensitive regulation. In particular, the time-dynamics is similar, with the
minimum capital requirement decreasing in good times – as risk declines – and
increasing in bad times. In other words, our model is able to replicate Basel II
cyclicality, even though via diﬀerent drivers.
In this respect, we label Basel II regulation as microprudential in the sense
that it disregards the feedback eﬀect that macro variables (i.e. changes in asset
prices) exert on banks’ behavior. Indeed, as we will see below, the key point is
that the decline in risk, besides the previously mentioned positive direct eﬀect
on incentives (and, under a microprudential regime, on capital requirement),
increases the demand and the equilibrium asset price. This would feed back on
incentives: from equations (1) and (2), incentives are jeopardized by p. High
prices lower the bank’s utility from high eﬀort while increasing the income in
liquidation.
2.6 Macroprudential regulation
In this section we analyze the equilibrium in the asset market at date 1. Adrian
and Shin (2010), in a similar setting, discuss the mechanism through which lever-
aged financial institutions’ demand for assets generates an amplified response
of asset prices to shocks to fundamentals.
The overall response of p to z can be obtained from the equilibrium condition
in the asset market. Equating demand and supply, we obtain:
￿ 1
e¯
x(e; p, z) dG(e) = S (6)
where x(e; p, z) is the asset demand of equation (4). The L.H.S is the aggre-
gate demand of securities from active banks, i.e. those with e ≥ e¯. Note that,
in order for e¯ to be an equilibrium, no active bank should shrink. G(e) is the
cumulative distribution function of banks with respect to equity. When G is a
uniform U [0, 1], with simple algebra, we obtain the price equation:
p =
1
S
￿
1− e¯2
2
− (1− q + z)(1− e¯)
￿
+ q − z (7)
The price equation (7) establishes an inverse relationship between the capital
requirement and the market clearing price (in the relevant range e¯ > 1− (q−z),
i.e. where x > 0). A decline in risk z and/or an improvement of the fundamental
value q both shift the price equation upward and make it flatter. Points E and
E￿ in Graph 3 are, respectively, the equilibrium with z and z￿.
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Graph 3: Asset market equilibrium following a decline in risk z￿ < z.
✲
✻
p
e¯
q
E
q − z0
IC(z)
. ................ ...............
...............
...............
..............
..............
..............
..............
.............
.............
..............
...............
...............
................
.................
................... .......... ...........
.........
..
........
....
.......
......
......
......
.
......
......
..
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.
.....
.....
.....
.
...
.....
.....
...
....
....
....
....
..
....
....
....
....
..
....
....
....
....
...
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
price eq.(z)
e¯(z, p¯)
p¯
E￿
. ....................... ...............
...............
..............
..............
..............
.............
.............
.............
............
...........
.............
.............
..............
...............
...............
................
.................
. ........... ............ .............
...........
..
.........
.....
........
.......
.......
.......
..
.......
.......
...
......
......
......
......
......
......
.....
......
......
.
.....
.....
....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.
.....
.....
.....
.....
..
price eq.(z￿)
IC(z￿)
e¯(z￿, p￿)
p￿
e¯(z￿, p¯)
Substituting equation (7) into equation (5), we obtain the equilibrium (macro-
prudential) capital requirement as a function of fundamentals (z and q). In the
relevant set of values for parameters, the capital requirement is
• A decreasing function of the fundamental risk z.
• An increasing function of the fundamental value of assets q.
In other words, during the expanding phase of the cycle when fundamental
risk is low and/or asset fundamental value is high the capital requirement that
preserves incentive compatibility should increase.
More in details, when the authority disregards the eﬀects of the shock on
p (so taking p = p¯ as given), the capital requirement declines from e¯(z, p¯) to
e¯(z￿, p¯), following the downward shift of the IC curve (Graph 3). Trivially, this
is not an equilibrium capital requirement as the clearing price would be much
larger than p¯. In that respect, the diﬀerence α ≡ e¯(z￿, p￿) − e¯(z￿, p) resembles
the macroprudential buﬀer advocated in the Basel III Accord. From conditions
(5) and (6), α is increasing in z− z￿: the larger the decline in fundamental risk,
the higher the buﬀer.
In sum, the policy response to a positive shock to fundamentals is simple.
As in the Basel III proposal, the undesirable consequences of too low capital
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requirements in good times can be mitigated by macroprudential buﬀers. In-
centive compatible regulation should thus ensure that incentives are reinforced
in favorable conditions via higher capital requirements, which take the form of
macroprudential add-ons (in the model, the quantity α).
3 Incentives through the cycle
It’s worth to emphasize that in our model, risk is actually made up of two
components. The “fundamental risk” z and the “deterioration risk” associated
to shirking behavior of banks. The latter is endogenous in the sense that it
depends on incentives. Incentives move in response to fundamentals, to regula-
tory actions and to a macro variable as asset prices. When (the perception of
- fundamental) risk is low, which typically happens in good times, banks asset
demand increases and this, in the first stage, is expected to improve their incen-
tives. Ceteris paribus, this lowers the minimum incentive compatible equity that
follows from condition (5). In the regulatory interpretation, in the expanding
phase of the cycle, the microprudential minimum capital requirement declines
as booming conditions boost eﬀort and incentives are more easily aligned. What
microprudential regulation neglects is the other, indirect, equilibrium eﬀect of
lower perceived risk on banks’ behavior: banks that become eager to expand
the balance sheet exert a positive pressure on asset prices. This triggers the
feedback eﬀect from macro variables to individual behavior: high asset prices
reduces the incentives for banks to exercise adequate eﬀort as the income from
liquidation is expected to be high. As a result, absent proper regulation, banks
would take on more and more “deterioration risk” at the very moment when fun-
damental risk is perceived to be low. In conclusion, microprudential regulation
would miss the indirect eﬀect that changes in asset prices exert on incentives.
In this respect, the growth of the subprime market and securitization in the US
in 2002-07 is a vivid and recent example; in particular, it can be truly crucial to
appreciate the negative distortion of incentives induced by higher payoﬀs in liq-
uidation induced by increasing asset prices; many argue that the deterioration
of lending standard has been largely determined by the belief that increasing
real estate prices would have continued to provide a floor to the value of assets.
The eﬀects described above resemble Borio et al. (2001)’s idea that the credit
cycle is endogenous with respect to the collective decisions of financial institu-
tions.5 And indeed our model shows - admittedly in a simplified setting - that
the forces that lead to the upswing may carry the seeds of the subsequent
downswing. In that respect, we are aligned with the spirit of Minsky’s financial
instability hypothesis, which does not rely upon negative exogenous shocks to
5According to Borio et al. (2001), those decisions are frequently based on misperceptions
of the evolution of risk over time.
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generate business cycles fluctuations (and financial instability), and with the
more recent work of Bhattacharya (2010).
In the dynamic version of the story, abstract from regulation, we have two
competing forces on incentives. Behaving banks exert a positive demand pres-
sure on asset prices. This creates room for shirking banks to free ride other
banks eﬀort, enjoying both private benefits from low eﬀort (B) and high income
in liquidation (p − c). In the expanding phase of the cycle, low risk and/or
high asset value increase the balance sheet capacity of banks. The positive
price externality triggered by behaving banks sows the seeds of the following
downturn as it decreases the marginal value of eﬀort so inducing the build up
of deterioration risk. The opposite happens when this high deterioration risk
materializes. Shirking banks would start to sell oﬀ their asset holdings. Low
asset prices boosts incentives and increase the marginal value of eﬀort.
In the previous story it emerges a relationship between excessive price volatil-
ity and prudential regulation. Indeed, microprudential capital requirement in
the style of Basel II (i.e. e¯(z￿, p¯)) set according to equation (5) would amplify
incentives and asset price volatility. On the other hand, macroprudential re-
quirement would smooth fluctuations and avoid equilibrium shirking and the
build up of deterioration risks.
4 Conclusions
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, a lively debate on the cyclicality of finan-
cial regulation and the possible options for mitigating it took place among policy
makers, regulators and the industry. The outcome has been an unanimous call
for a macroprudential approach to regulation. However, the discussion has been
largely on the policy side, while the theoretical underpinnings of macropruden-
tial devices have been generally neglected.
In this paper, we set up an incentive model in which banks face – beyond
endogenous constraints to asset demand – a capital regulation that also aﬀects
their ability to subscribe new assets. The objective of capital regulation is to
ensure that banks put eﬀort in their monitoring activities, thus avoiding too
risky investments and containing the probability of deterioration of the quality
of the asset side of their balance sheet. Banks’ eﬀort is aﬀected both by micro
(fundamentals) and macro (market) variables. While our aim is not to setup a
general framework for banking regulation as we concentrate only on one aspect of
it, the model sheds some light on how microprudential rules (those that disregard
the feedback eﬀect of macro variables on incentives) may pose – particularly in
benign economic conditions – wrong incentives to banks and suggests that a
macro-perspective may be deemed necessary.
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An illustrative example is a positive macro shock to fundamentals (say, a
decline in the fundamental risk of assets). Favorable financial conditions af-
fect bankers’ incentives. In fact, the shock relaxes Value-at-Risk constraints
and boosts the ability of banks to expand the balance sheet (Adrian and Shin
(2010)) so increasing the optimal eﬀort. Since banks are expected to volun-
tarily (endogenously) put high eﬀort, (microprudential) capital requirements
decrease. Lower capital requirements would add to other endogenous mecha-
nisms and boost the demand for assets. Indeed, booming demand is the result of
the procyclical behavior of leveraged financial institutions. Unfortunately, the
soar in asset prices (and the associated high income in liquidation) feeds back on
incentives and countervails the initial direct eﬀect of the decline in fundamental
risk: this implies that the eﬀort in booming times may actually be lower than in
normal times and that stricter capital requirements would be needed to avoid
perverse behavior and value destruction. While the model is very simplified,
the mechanisms it envisages are fully consistent with what happened before
and during the big financial crisis.
There are two important policy implications of these results. First, banks
plant in favorable conditions the seeds for future problems. In the dynamic
version of the story, the initial improvement in fundamentals (that ameliorates
incentives) is quickly coupled with the increase in the asset prices (that jeop-
ardizes incentives). In this expanding phase, absent proper policy intervention
on capital requirements, the incentive distortion is under way. Therefore, it
is key that a macroprudential capital buﬀer is added to microprudential capi-
tal requirements to align incentives through the business cycle. Our evidence
provides thus strong theoretical support for the Basel III countercyclical buﬀer.
Second, eﬀective macroprudential policies should not only aim at the accu-
mulation of reserves to be used when, somehow exogenously, “bad times arrive”.
Rather, they stand as eﬀective policy tools to correct a class of distortions as-
sociated with the mutual reinforcing interaction between leveraged institutions
balance sheet positions, increasing asset prices and incentives to provide sound
risk management. On the other hand, the realignment of incentives may re-
quire severe buﬀer levels and their costs in terms of credit supply should not be
neglected. We leave this as an open issue for future research.
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